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Abstract 
Though the evolution of prisons and the prison system in medieval Europe is a well-
developed field in the history of law, little attention has been paid to prisons and 
incarceration on the frontiers of Latin Christendom. The present study makes use of 
archival and literary sources in order to examine how prisons functioned in Venice's 
most important colony, the island of Crete. As there has been no previous study of 
prisons and incarceration in medieval Greece, the article's first aim is to establish some 
basic facts about the prisons of Crete, such as their locations, their organisation and their 
system of administration. More importantly however, the study investigates the role that 
incarceration played in the legal system of the Venetian colony and attempts to set this 
role within the context of the juridical developments of the Late Middle Ages. Of 
particular interest is the question of how closely the legal system of the Venetian colony 
followed the judicial practice of the metropolis and whether it was influenced by the 
pre-existing legal institutions of Byzantium. Finally, the study also examines how the 
jurisprudence of the colonial regime dealt with offenders of different ethnic background 
and legal status. 
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The evolution of prisons and the prison system in Europe is a well-developed field in the 
study of the history of law. The High and Late Middle Ages marked an important turning 
point in this evolution. Punitive incarceration, which today is virtually synonymous with the 
concept of criminal justice, was all but non-existent in Aantiquity and the early Middle Ages. 
Though all organizsed societies had their own version of the prison (private, public or 
ecclesiastical), by and large the purpose of those prisons was not to punish and correct 
criminals; rather, they functioned as a temporary place of confinement for the accused 
awaiting trial or for the condemned awaiting the execution of their sentence. Alternatively, 
they were a means of coercion, by which private individuals or the state might coerce debtors 
to pay their debts or adversaries to comply with their wishes.2 The process by which the 
various legal systems of Europe came to employ punitive incarceration, initially alongside 
custodial and coercive incarceration, and eventually as the main penalty for breaking the law, 
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are well-researched and cannot be rehearsed here. Suffice it for now to state that three key 
factors that coincided, broadly speaking between the twelfth and the thirteenth century, 
played a major role in this process. The first of these factors was the influence of the 
Cchurch: averse to the corporal punishments that were the norm in criminal cases, the 
Cchurch was the one institution that employed punitive incarceration for the delinquents 
under its jurisdiction, namely the clergy. The developments in canon law in the twelfth 
century also influenced secular jurisprudence; and the institution of the Inquisition in the 
thirteenth century, which made wide use of punitive incarceration, led directly to the 
proliferation of prisons throughout western Europe.3 The second factor is the consolidation of 
power, either in the hands of the national monarchies, or, as was the case in Italy, those of the 
Communes, which was accompanied by the authorities’ preoccupation with justice and 
keeping the peace.4 Closely related to that was the third factor, the rediscovery of Roman law 
and the subsequent developments in learned law, partly as a means of bolstering central 
authority. In Italy in particular, the result of this process was the codification of law in the 
form of the various Communes’ statutes.5  
 An area where prisons and prison sentences have not been the focus of much attention 
is that of the fringes of Latin Christendom; the areas, that is, that came under Latin control, 
but did not form part of wWestern Europe. The Latin states of Greece are a particularly 
interesting area in which to examine the evolution of jurisprudence: here, the Latin Cchurch 
was superimposed on a largely hostile population, secular authority, although sometimes very 
centralised (as was the case in Venetian Crete) was rarely unchallenged by rival claimants 
and the laws imported by the western conquerors came to supplant a much older and better-
established legal tradition, that of Byzantium. Crete, and its capital Candia, which forms the 
focus of this study, presents the historian with an excellent, if unique, case study. As the 
centrepiece of Venice’s colonial empire, Crete had extremely centralizsed power structures 
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and its metropolitan government in Venice was at the forefront of developments in 
jurisprudence. The Venetians’ meticulous record-keeping, moreover, has preserved an 
abundance of sources relating to crime and punishment. What is more, references to prisons 
are almost ubiquitous in the surviving sources; this despite the fact that the Venetian statutes, 
codified in 1249 and expanded thereafter, rarely mention penalties of incarceration.6 Despite 
all this, there exists no dedicated study of the prison system of medieval Crete, though 
valuable information on the subject can be found in the work of Elisabeth Santschi, dealing 
primarily with criminal investigations on the island.7 More recently, Romina Tsakiri’s 
doctoral thesis also cast an eye on the prisons of Candia, but with particular reference to the 
eEarly mModern period.8  
Focusing mainly on the fourteenth century, the following pages will examine the role 
played by incarceration in the legal system of the Venetian colony and will attempt to set this 
role in the context of the juridical developments of the age. The study also aims to answer 
some basic questions about how the prisons of Candia functioned, with respect to 
organizsation and living conditions. Finally, bearing in mind that the majority of the native 
population was classed as unfree, the case of Crete also gives us the opportunity to examine 
how the jurisprudence of such a colonial regime dealt with offenders of different ethnic 
background and legal status.  
We are fortunate enough to possess a variety of sources for this investigation, both in 
the form of official governmental documents and in the form of literary material. The official 
documentation derives both from Crete as well as from Venice. The colonial government of 
Crete, appointed by Venice for fixed terms of two years, was always closely supervised by 
the metropolis. As a result, many ordinances concerning important legal affairs of Crete 
emanated from the dDoge and his councils in Venice. As far as the sources emanating from 
Crete are concerned, there exist three major series of documents (preserved at the Archivio di 
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Stato di Venezia) which are pertinent to this investigation: the records of civil and criminal 
cases examined by the courts of Candia and the records of the official proclamations (bandi), 
made by the town criers. All of these sources are fragmentary, but considerable material has 
survived for the fourteenth century.9 The information from this material is complemented by 
the literary works of Stephanos Sachlikes and Leonardus Dellaporta, the two Cretan poets 
who wrote their poems while incarcerated and painted a most vivid picture of life in the 
prisons of Candia.     
 
The Venetian background 
Venetian law was codified by order of Doge Jacopo Tiepolo (r. 1229–-49), between 
1242 and 1249.10 The product of this codification was the Venetian statutes. Thenceforth, the 
statutes were periodically updated. In a symbolic move, designed to excise Byzantine 
influence from the ‘constitution’ of the fledgling Venetian empire, the statutes made a point 
of not including Roman law in their sources.11 Nevertheless, Roman influence is plain to see 
in the statutes; this is hardly surprising given Venice’s long history as a Byzantine province. 
The bulk of the statutes deals predominantly with matters of civil law. Matters of 
criminal law are addressed mainly in the Liber Promissionis Maleficii (composed in 1232 and 
included in the statutes) and in Book 6 of the statutes, which consists of revisions made in 
later centuries.12 Though imprisonment is mentioned on several occasions in the statutes, 
including some of the ones dealing with civil matters, it is very rarely encountered as a legal 
penalty in and of itself. Rather, it is envisioned predominantly as a means of coercion. 
Chapter 45 of Book 1, for example, stipulates that debtors who fail to pay their debts are to be 
held in the court ‘according to custom’, while the creditor is given access to their 
possessions.13 Likewise, those convicted of looting shipwrecks and failing to pay back what 
they stole, ought to have their houses demolished and be incarcerated, until they make 
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complete restitution to the injured party.14 Incarceration for violent crime is virtually 
unknown; instead, criminals are punished according to a system of tariffs ranging from 
simple fines to corporal punishments (including mutilation and blinding) and death. The 
singular exception occurs in the case of convicted rapists who are to be imprisoned for eight 
days, until they pay their victims a sum equal to their dowry. Failure to do this within eight 
days would result in the rapist’s blinding.15 Again, therefore, incarceration is not the actual 
penalty for the crime, but a means of coercing the offender to make restitution. 
Despite all this, it is evident that Venetian law allowed tacitly for incarceration to be 
used as a penalty. There are two indications of this, within the statutes themselves. The law 
considered a criminal case proven, only in the event where the accused was proven guilty by 
confession or by the testimony of witnesses. If these conditions obtained, then the judges 
were required to pronounce sentence according to the system of tariffs stipulated by the 
statutes. However, failure to prove the case by confession or witnesses did not necessarily 
mean that the accused was acquitted and released. If the judges remained convinced of his or 
her guilt, they were allowed to convict and pronounce a sentence according to their own 
conscience.16 This sentence would presumably be lighter than the full penalty stipulated by 
the law, and might therefore include incarceration. Similarly, the final chapter (29) of the 
Liber Promissionis Maleficii stipulates that, since only a finite number of crimes could be 
listed in the law code, the punishment for all other crimes was left at the discretion of the 
judges.17 That these ‘loopholes’ resulted in the imposition of penal incarceration becomes 
evident from a revision of the law on the discretion of judges, enacted in 1329. Here, it is 
stipulated that in cases of robbery and pillaging that remain unproven by witnesses or 
confession, the sentences imposed at the discretion of the judges should not include 
incarceration, but should be limited to corporal punishments.18  
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This cursory examination of the Venetian statutes shows that at the time of their 
codification in the thirteenth century, the laws of Venice did not envision incarceration as a 
punishment. Certain crimes resulted in the incarceration of the offender, but only as a means 
of enforcing the actual penalty, usually the payment of a fine. The prisons, of course, also 
served for the detention of those awaiting trial. By the fourteenth century, however, penal 
incarceration had become much more common, partly as a result of the discretion allowed to 
judges in sentencing criminals. This was sometimes seen as an abuse, or as undue mitigation 
of the correct penalties, and legislation was therefore enacted to counteract the process.  
The judges certainly continued to pass sentences of incarceration, especially for lesser 
crimes, not covered in the statutes. A single famous example may illustrate the point here. In 
1388, the son of Doge Antonio Venier (r. 1382–-1400) was sentenced to two months’ 
imprisonment and a fine, for writing scurrilous and abusive graffiti on the house of a 
Venetian noble.19 Out of respect for the laws, Antonio Venier did not grant his son pardon, 
but allowed him to go to prison. This personal experience may have resulted in a piece of 
legislation promulgated by the dDoge in 1391, aiming at the reform of the prison system. The 
document is one of our most important sources for the organizsation and living conditions of 
medieval Venetian prisons.20       
Much has been written about both these topics, which cannot be discussed but in the 
broadest of terms here:21 having grown organically, rather than by design, the prisons of 
Venice did not come under the jurisdiction of a single governmental department, but 
pertained to several different councils and offices.22 As is well known, the main prisons were 
situated inside the Ppalazzo Dducale (namely, the Pozzi and the Piombi), but various smaller 
sites existed in the city’s sestieri; these functioned mainly as jails, for the detention of minor 
offenders overnight or for the detention of those awaiting trial.23 Living conditions varied 
widely for the inmates. This was a standard feature of many medieval prisons, because 
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prisoners were often required to pay for their own upkeep, though in Venice the state 
provided basic subsistence for all prisoners. This meant of course that wealthier inmates were 
allowed a higher standard of living, with better food and more respectable living quarters.24 
In Venice in particular, at least after Antonio Venier’s reforms of 1391, the prison population 
was supposed to be segregated according to the severity and nature of its crimes, so that 
prisoners for debt would not share space with murderers and other hardened criminals.25 
Certain prisoners were also allowed to exit their cells and move about the prison corridors, 
while others were even permitted to leave the prison on parole and return to their cells at 
night.26 Conditions were much harsher for others, who were held in isolation and, usually, 
chained. It follows, that more serious crimes entailed harsher confinement, but the social 
status of the prisoner continued to affect his or her living conditions. It is stipulated, for 
example, in the reform legislation, that lower- class debtors might be held together with the 
violent criminals, segregation measures notwithstanding.27          
 
The Byzantine background 
 Just as was the case in the West, Byzantine law did not provide for incarceration as a 
legal penalty. In fact, according to a glosser of Leo VI’s Basilika, such penalties were 
forbidden.28 In theory at least, prisons served strictly for the detention of those awaiting trial. 
Convicted criminals were subjected to a range of different penalties, which included fines, 
corporal punishment (including various types of mutilation and blinding) and death.29 It is 
worth noting that, though incarceration was theoretically prohibited, the law did provide for 
the confinement of certain criminals in monasteries, either as tonsured members of the 
monastic community, or as simple detainees.30 This penal cloistering also existed in the West 
(though in a less institutionalizsed form), but is not expressly attested in Venetian 
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legislation.31 On the contrary, the penalty of exile, a form of confinement very widely used in 
Roman and Byzantine law, was also extensively adopted by the Venetians. 
 Nonetheless it is certain that incarceration was also used as a penalty, though perhaps 
it was not a penalty that was regularly imposed by the courts. Bourdara has suggested that the 
penalty of incarceration was often applied to criminals found guilty of lèse majesté. The 
normal penalty for this crime was death, but on occasion this was commuted to 
imprisonment. She also points out that the only authority competent to judge such a crime 
was the emperor himself.32 It would appear therefore that penal imprisonment was at times 
imposed by the emperors as a commuted, lighter punishment for those who had in some way 
opposed his authority. The poet Michael Glykas, who was imprisoned during the reign of 
Manuel I Comnenus, wrote that he was held together with criminals condemned for treason, 
sedition, forgery of the royal signature, murder, blasphemy, and theft.33 The first three of 
these crimes could easily fall into the category of lèse majesté. However, Tthe inclusion in 
the list of murder, blasphemy, and theft, however, into the list, shows that a similar process of 
mitigating penalties must have taken place for more mundane crimes as well.  
  Furthermore, it appears that at times prisons were also used for the detention of 
debtors. Though the laws did not expressly prescribe prison sentences for debt, the Byzantine 
historian Pachymeres (1242-c.1310) attests that the penalty was used against those burdened 
by public debt.34  This was obviously a coercive measure, similar to the ones employed by the 
Venetian Republic to force debtors to pay, but with two important differences:  these 
imprisonments do not seem to have been expressly sanctioned by the law as was the case in 
Venice; they seem rather to have been, once again, the prerogative of the emperor himself. 
Furthermore, Pachymeres states clearly that only public debtors were confined. In Venice, by 
contrast, the state imposed such penalties on private debtors as well as public ones. 
Cecaumenus (c.1020/24-c.1078)  also offers a similar testimony of imprisonment for public 
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debt in his Strategikon. He relates the story of a tax-collector who fell into debt and was 
subsequently sent to the poorhouse. It is evident though that this poorhouse was in actual fact 
a prison, where the tax-collector spent his days chained to the stocks inside a dark cell.35  
 It is evident from the above, that incarceration for a variety of offencses was 
employed in Byzantium, despite the absence of relevant legislation. Whether these penalties 
were imposed abusively, that is to say in contravention of the law, is unclear. It seems more 
likely that, by and large, these were mitigated penalties imposed for serious crimes, instead of 
death or mutilation and, perhaps, at the discretion of the emperor himself.  
 
 Prison sentences in Venetian Crete 
   As was the case in Venice herself, Roman (i.e., Byzantine) law was formally 
excluded from the jurisprudence of the Venetian colony of Crete. The sources of law for the 
colony have been preserved in the oath sworn by the island’s judges, which list four such 
sources in ranked order.36 First and foremost were the statutes of Venice. If a case was not 
covered by the statutes, then the judge ought to proceed judging de simili ad simile. Failing 
this, he should follow good custom, and if no custom existed he should judge the case 
according to his conscience.37 To these sources, we should add two more that are often 
encountered in our material: the various ordinances emanating from Venice relating to the 
colonies, which were dispatched to the competent authorities in Crete; and the ordinances 
promulgated by the colonial authorities on the island, referred to sometimes as ordines 
terre.38 These ordinances (especially those coming from Venice) could overrule any existing 
legislation. The jurisprudence of Venetian Crete, therefore, was based on the laws and 
governmental acts of Venice, the acts of the government in Candia, and established 
precedent. Despite, however, the heavy dependence on the laws of Venice, which very rarely 
prescribed prison sentences, incarceration seems to have been very regularly applied in Crete.  
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 In the mid-fourteenth century, there existed four prisons in Crete.39 Of these, our 
sources mention two by name, both situated in Candia: one is referred to as carcer castelli or 
carcer forte castelli or simply as castellum and the other as carcer ponentis. The prominence 
of these two prisons in our sources makes it clear that these they were the island’s main 
prisons. The third one must have been the women’s prison founded in Candia after 1314 
(discussed below). The last one remains unidentified. It may have also been in Candia, 
though there is some evidence to suggest it was situated in the town of Chanea.40 That three, 
– or perhaps all four – of the island’s prisons were located in the capital, is not surprising, for 
it is there that most trials were held. Evidence of this can be seen in the capitularies of 
captains and castellans of the island. These local officials, who had jurisdiction over 
territories outside of Candia, were allowed to try cases, but only those that warranted 
relatively modest pecuniary sentences of up to twenty-five hyperpera. Those accused of more 
serious crimes had to be transported under guard to Candia, where they would be tried and 
punished.41  
 The location of only one of the afore-mentioned prisons can be determined with any 
certainty: the carcer castelli was located in the fort known as Castellum Communis, or simply 
as Castellum, which the Venetians had built as part of the city’s maritime fortifications in the 
thirteenth century. The fort, built for the defence of the port, was located at the tip of the 
western breakwater. It was destroyed in the fifteenth century and a new fortress was built on 
its site, called Castello di Mare or Rocca a Mare, which today is known by its Turkish name, 
Koules.42  
 The second prison, the carcer ponentis may have been located within the city’s 
western fortifications: wWe know from a proclamation of 18 September 1347 that a prison 
existed within the walls of the city.43 This was clearly a different prison from the one called 
castellum so it is probable that it is a reference to the city’s other main prison. 
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 In order to examine how incarceration functioned in medieval Candia, one would do 
well to investigate who went to prison and what for what reason. Broadly speaking, there are 
four categories of prisoners in our sources. The first, and most straightforward of these 
categories, comprised the people who were in prison awaiting trial. It is probable that they 
formed the most populous element of the prison population. Santschi has remarked that the 
criminal trials of Candia were relatively speedy affairs, never lasting longer than two years 
and often lasting a good deal less.44 Nevertheless, two years is sufficient time for a significant 
number of detainees to accumulate in the prisons, especially considering the fact that all 
criminal cases of the island appear to have been tried in the capital. This segment of the 
prison population must have faced the harshest living conditions, given the fact that torture 
was routinely employed during criminal investigations.45  
 The second category comprised debtors, who had been sentenced to imprisonment for 
failure to pay their debts. This was in perfect accordance with Venetian law, which stipulated 
the detention of defaulting debtors. It is worth noting that the Venetian statutes did not 
provide for a minimum amount under which the debtor would be exempt from incarceration. 
In theory, therefore, debtors could end up imprisoned even for very small debts. The same 
appears to have been the case in Crete. We hear, for example, of Theodorus Malaspina, who 
in 1348 escaped from prison, where he had been sentenced for a modest debt of seventeen 
hyperpera.46 His case was surely not exceptional. This is indicated by some of the surviving 
wills of medieval Candia: as was the case elsewhere in Europe and especially in Venice, 
charity to prisoners came to be seen as a meritorious and pious deed. Accordingly, many 
testators bequeathed various sums to the prisoners, either towards their subsistence, or so that 
they may be released from prison. The sums pledged, however, towards the freeing of debtors 
are sometimes very modest. In 1325, for example, Petrus Mudacio left twenty-five hyperpera 
for the freeing of several incarcerated debtors.47 More glaringly, in 1362, Nicolaus Ragusio 
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pledged the generous sum of one hundred hyperpera for the freeing of prisoners but stipulated 
that no more than five hyperpera should be put towards any single individual.48 One may 
assume therefore, that debtors could end up in prison for debts that were, if not negligible, at 
least very modest.49 
  This indiscriminate use of debt incarceration resulted in some serious problems for the 
colony of Crete: the economy of Venetian Crete (as indeed that of the metropolis) was a 
highly monetizsed one. Despite the semi-feudal terminology adopted by the Venetian 
authorities to describe the societal structures imposed on the colony, this was a society that 
depended, not just on agricultural production, but also on commerce and entrepreneurship. 
Consequently, it relied very heavily on credit, as is proven by the ubiquitous contracts for 
loans and investments that one encounters in the island’s surviving notarial archive. Given 
the colony’s inherent instability, one can imagine how easily a borrower or investor could 
suddenly face insolvency: frequent warfare with accompanying levies, incessant local 
rebellions, as well as the plague of 1348, might all have made Cretan debtors particularly 
vulnerable. Yet it would appear that the law was not in step with social developments 
resulting in the criminalizsation and incarceration of an increasing number of individuals who 
were not unwilling to pay but had simply become insolvent.  
We may be sure that this became a significant issue, because it attracted the attention 
of the metropolitan authorities in Venice on several occasions: iIn 1384 and again in 1400 the 
government of Crete was ordered by the Venetian Senate to facilitate the payment of debts, 
for the benefit of impoverished debtors who were abandoning the island. In the second 
instance, it was said that many debtors, fearing prison, not only fled Crete but found refuge 
aboard Turkish ships and served as guides in raids against Venetian lands.50 The matter had 
preoccupied the local authorities as early as 1347: from that time onwards, the government 
repeatedly proclaimed that debtors who had fled the island on account of debt convictions 
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could return freely and would be given the opportunity to set up payment plans with their 
creditors under favourable terms.51 None of these efforts appears to have solved the problem, 
and Venice had to intervene again, in 1411: on this occasion, once more, the Venetian Senate 
stated explicitly that many debtors who were unable to pay their debts were fleeing the island 
out of fear of imprisonment. Because this was detrimental to the colony, the duke of Candia 
was ordered to offer these people extensions on the payment of their debts.52    
All of the above presents us with clear evidence that incarceration for debt was 
becoming increasingly commonplace, though at times it was certainly counterproductive. The 
very concept of incarceration for debt might seem counterproductive, as imprisoned debtors, 
unable to exercise their professions, would find it even harder to raise the required money. 
Fortunately, two court cases from the late fourteenth century illustrate how the process could 
work. In 1389, Maria Rodena was imprisoned for a private debt of twenty hyperpera. Unable 
to pay, she petitioned the court and succeeded in making her own debtors liable to pay the 
debt.53 In a similar, though much more expensive, case Philippus Piçamano had been 
imprisoned for a public debt of 3,000 hyperpera. He subsequently petitioned the court to seek 
part of the money from his own debtors. Despite the fact that the court acceded to his request, 
Philippus escaped from prison and went on the run. His wife then petitioned the court to 
recognizse her as the creditor of her husband’s debtors so that she might proceed to pay off 
the debt.54 These two cases illustrate first of all how easily one could become insolvent. Both 
the debtors in question were unable to pay their debts, even though they themselves were 
clearly owed money which they had not been able to collect. Once imprisoned, however, they 
were able to pass on liability for their debt to their own debtors. Collection of these second 
debts would then presumably become the business of the courts, and the original debtors 
would be set free.55 Of course in these two cases, the imprisoned debtors were fortunate, 
because even though they were insolvent, they were not destitute; they had assets, in the form 
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of debtors, which they were able to put towards the payment of the money they owed. Others 
would have been less fortunate and would have had to spend indefinite periods of time in 
prison with little hope of paying off their debts.      
Another category of prisoners consisted of those who were imprisoned for failure to 
pay a fine. It is not clear whether any failure to pay a fine would result in imprisonment, but 
certain sentences did include this stipulation. In 1320, for instance, it was declared that any 
nobleman or person of authority who became involved in, and influenced, disputes among the 
clergy would be liable to pay a fine of 100 hyperpera, or go to prison for a year.56 Similarly, 
any who drew arms within a church, would have to pay 200 hyperpera or spend two years in 
prison.57 The more serious the offence, the higher the fine was and the longer the prison 
sentence that failure to pay would incur. In fact there seems to have existed a relatively 
common tariff: fines of 50 hyperpera incurred sentences of six months; one hundred 
hyperpera incurred sentences of a year; and two hundred hyperpera incurred sentences of two 
years.58 This ‘tariff’, of course, was not universally applicable. In December 1338, for 
example, the government of Crete issued a prohibition against Christian women serving as 
wet nurses for Jewish infants. Among the penalties proclaimed for the Jewish employers was 
a 200- hyperpera fine, or a prison sentence of one year.59 All of this was completely in step 
with contemporary juridical developments in Venice, where the relationship between fines 
and punitive incarceration had already been firmly established by the early fourteenth 
century. In fact, by 1303, a formal calculus had been devised in Venice, by which pecuniary 
sentences were converted to prison sentences. According to this calculus, failure to pay fines 
of twenty-five pounds incurred a sentence of six months in prison, fines between twenty-five 
and 50 fifty pounds incurred prison sentences of nine months and fines between 50 fifty and 
100 one hundred pounds incurred sentences of a year.60 Although I am not aware of a similar 
calculus having been formally established in Crete, it is evident that this Venetian practice 
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was transplanted to the island almost verbatim, albeit with some modifications to the amounts 
and their resultant prison sentences.    
There are certain similarities between this category of prisoners and the defaulting 
debtors mentioned above; most obviously that they were both imprisoned essentially over 
pecuniary matters. There is also, however, a very important difference: the prison sentences 
referred to here were not coercive in the same sense as those employed against defaulting 
debtors. They were certainly aimed at persuading offenders to pay their fines, but once the 
offender had defaulted, he or she were  imprisoned not indefinitely, but for a set period of 
time. In other words, release was not necessarily dependant on payment of dues. Nonetheless, 
one may detect the same process at work here as in the category examined above; namely, the 
increased use of incarceration for offences that in the past may have not warranted a prison 
sentence. 
More serious crimes could result in both a fine and a prison sentence. Thus, those who 
contravened the government’s prohibition against smuggling serfs and slaves off the island in 
their boats, would be liable to both fines and incarceration. Moreover, in cases like this, the 
prison sentence would not officially start until after the offender had paid off the fine. Such 
was the case of Georgius Flascomagulo, who in 1341 was found guilty of transporting men to 
Palatia without permission. He was sentenced to a fine of one hundred hyperpera and three 
months in prison. By July, he had already spent four months in prisonconfinement, but 
though his prison sentence had not officially started, because he had yet to pay his fine.61 
Iohannes Argiro, in the early fifteenth century was even more unfortunate: he had been 
sentenced to three years in prison and a fine of 150 hyperpera. By 1403 he had already spent 
two years in prison but his sentence had not yet started because he was destitute and could 
not afford to pay the fine. Eventually, fearing that he would die in prison, the authorities 
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recognizsed the two years as time served, and allowed him to get out ofleave prison on parole 
and beg for money with which to pay the fine.62  
It is noteworthy that amongst those convicted to similar sentences, we encounter 
several individuals found guilty of low-level violence. The Venetian statutes stipulated that 
those guilty of simple assault were liable to pay two fines, one to the state and one to the 
victim; those attacking with a sword and causing bloodshed would pay no less than twenty-
five pounds to the victim, while if they killed their victim, they would face capital 
punishment. Assaults that took place under any other conditions were left to the discretion of 
the judges.63 In Candia the judges seem to have favoured prison sentences as a supplement to 
fines, for attacks that were not serious enough to warrant corporal punishment. Thus, for 
example, the Greek monk Caçucana was sentenced to three months in prison and a fine of 
100 hyperpera in 1364, for striking G. Dimiterello and causing a fray in the piazza.64 
Likewise, Marcus Truno was sentenced to a 50-hyperpera fine and three months in prison for 
injuring Iohannes Sclavo.65 A more puzzling case is that of Guilelmus Sanudo, who in 1346, 
was found guilty of assisting his brother in abducting a woman. His brother subsequently 
attempted to rape the woman, and in the struggle ended up killing her. For his role in the 
crime, Guilelmus was sentenced to a fine of 50 hyperpera and a year in the lower prison.66 
Though a year in the lower prison was certainly not an enviable prospect, the sentence seems 
relatively light in view of the seriousness gravity of the crime. All three elements of this 
crime were treated as very serious by Venetian law: abduction on its own could warrant a 
prison sentence, while rapists could be blinded and murderers ought to be hanged. Guilelmus 
had only participated in the woman’s abduction and had not been present at the murder, but 
Venetian law recognizsed joint culpability for accomplices in criminal acts, and thus one 
would expect a much harder penalty.67 Be that as it may, what it is once again evident, is that, 
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when allowed discretion in the exercise of their duties, the judges of Candia supplemented 
the penalties stipulated in the Venetian statutes with sentences of incarceration. 
Imprisonment was also used as a supplement to sentences of exile, which were very 
common, especially as punishment for some violent crimes.68 In such cases, the offenders 
were either sentenced to a period in prison followed by exile, or simply threatened that if they 
broke the terms of their exile they would be thrown in prison, and then subsequently banished 
once more.69  
In addition to all these cases, many other crimes that are difficult to categorizse were 
occasionally punished by imprisonment. Those are, perhaps, the most interesting, because 
despite their diversity many of them are essentially offences against the state. Those range 
from trivial cases of perjury, to corruption of public officials and even cases of sedition.  
Cases of corruption were dealt with severely, both in Venice and in Crete. In the mid-
fifteenth century a number of high-ranking officials from Crete (including the duke and his 
councillors) were found guilty of corruption and maladministration of public money, and 
were punished with significant prison sentences in Venice, deprivation of all offices, exile 
and astronomical fines.70 In Crete, a Greek priest who had forged a charter was sentenced to a 
year in prison, if he presented himself willingly, or a year in prison followed by perpetual 
exile if he tried to avoid his punishment.71 Even thus, he should count himself lucky, for 
another forger, the notary Michaletus Justiniani, who had been found guilty of falsifying 
documents, was paraded through the streets with the forged documents hanging from his 
neck, had his right hand cut off and his eyes plucked out, and then was banished from the 
island.72    
Venice was famously harsh with those who defied her authority, and few who openly 
rebelled could hope to escape with their lives. It is worth remembering that after the uprising 
Revolt of Saint Titus (1363–8), even the sons of the leading rebels, many of whom were 
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infants at the time, were punished with deprivation of political rights and property, as well as 
by exile.73 Prison sentences were also employed against rebels, especially if they had not 
been amongst the leaders. Significantly, cases such as these were amongst the few which 
warranted perpetual imprisonment, a sentence abhorred by both Roman and communal law 
alike. The sons of Ioannes Kallergis, for example, who had acted under the command of their 
father during the Saint Titus rebellion, were sentenced to life imprisonment in Venice.74 
Similarly, the sons of Vardas Kallergis and one of the Siphopouloi, whose fathers had 
rebelled in 1333, were spending prison sentences in Candia but managed to escape in 1341.75 
Another Kallergis, Costas, had been sentenced to prison for ceding the castle of Kissamos to 
the rebels (probably during the Saint Titus revolt). In 1377 he appealed, claiming that he had 
had no choice but to surrender the castle, prompting a re-examination of his case in Venice.76 
Then there were those whose involvement with sedition was entirely peripheral, or perhaps 
simply suspected rather than proven. Thus, around the time of the said revolt of St Titus, we 
encounter a spate of incarcerations for offenders who had uttered ‘verba inhonesta coram 
dominio’ or ‘verba contra bonum statum huius terre’.77 These vague expressions refer to 
utterances made against the Republic or in support of the rebels, as is proven by a letter 
addressed by the Comune to Venice, in November 1364.78 That these offences must have 
amounted to little more than off-hand remarks is shown by the case of Leonardus Dellaporta, 
who, prison sentence notwithstanding, went on to have a bright diplomatic career as a faithful 
subject of the Republic.79 It is worth noting here, that the rebels had also resorted to 
incarcerating their political opponents during the brief period they held power in Candia. A 
number of notable loyalists thus found themselves imprisoned in 1363, including the rectors 
of Chanea and Rethymno, and even the bishop of Corone, who had come to the island as a 
mediator. One of the most fanatical of the rebels had even tried to set fire to the prisons in 
order to burn the loyalist prisoners inside.80 
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Other crimes that threatened the colony’s status quo, though less overtly, were also 
punishable by imprrisonment. Venice had long feared, for example, the subversive influence 
of the Greek clergy –, especially monks –, and had sought to limit their influx into the island. 
In 1349 and again in 1350 the authorities decreed that any Greek monks that tried to enter 
Crete would be imprisoned for six months and subsequently deported.81 Another decree of 
1349 shows one of the ways in which the Greek clergy subverted authority: it was said that 
many Greek monasteries harboured escaped slaves (presumably by taking them in as monks), 
believing that this pleases God. Any members of the Greek clergy found doing this would be 
incarcerated for six months.82 Prison was also threatened to those who endangered Venice’s 
interests, for example, by exporting war materials to Muslim lands, or by exporting goods for 
which a state monopoly existed.83 Finally, those liable for service in the fleet who failed to 
present themselves when called up were also threatened with incarceration.  
This brief review of prison sentences is by no means exhaustive, and many more 
offences punishable by incarceration may be found in the surviving sources; but nevertheless, 
certain patterns begin to emerge. It is obvious, for instance, that prison sentences were meted 
out a lot more frequently than Venetian legislation expressly dictated. This, of course was 
also the case in Venice and most other parts of Europe as well. Paradoxically, it seems that 
prison sentences were employed both as intensifiers for relatively soft penalties and as a 
mitigant alternatives for much harsher ones. We have seen for example that cases of assault 
were sometimes punished with both a fine and incarceration, rather than the simple fine 
prescribed by the Venetian statutes. Equally, those selling watered-down wine were 
threatened with a month’s imprisonment, despite the fact that no such penalty was stipulated 
in the statutes for falsifying merchandise.84 On the other hand, however, we also encounter an 
accessory to abduction, rape and murder being punished by imprisonment, and even outright 
rebels sentenced to prison rather than death, presumably in recognition of extenuating 
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circumstances.85 These sentences all reflect the ‘gap between legal theory and legislation’ 
which Geltner has detected in Venice and other Italian cities, and which also became a 
feature of the Venetian colony’s jurisprudence.86  
All of this certainly resulted in some serious discrepancies between the penalties 
inflicted on offenders and the severity of their respective crimes. Leaving aside some life 
terms imposed on certain rebels, most prison sentences, even for serious crimes, did not 
exceed two years. Yet at the same time, defaulting debtors might be held indefinitely, until 
they could repay their debt. Furthermore, wealthy offenders were often able to buy off their 
prison sentence, even if the sentence had not been incurred because of a debt or a fine. One of 
the ways to do this was by petitioning for pardon in return for providing a man to do galley 
service, for a period equal to the prison sentence. In other words, wealthy prisoners were 
allowed to buy their freedom, by simply hiring a mercenary for the government’s fleet. In 
1396, the Venetian Ssenate intervened and prohibited this practice, stating that it prevented 
the course of justice and offered no satisfaction to the criminals’ victims.87 All these things 
are side-effects of the process that took place at this time: the expansion of the prison 
system’s remit to deal with a variety of different offences, apart from the onesthose expressly 
mentioned in the statutes. Violent crime was still punished predominantly by corporal or 
capital punishment, but other types of crime, especially those that threatened, or infringed on 
the rights of, the Comune were increasingly punished by incarceration.  
The judges’ freedom to exercise their discretion in sentencing played an important 
part in this process. As we have seen, this freedom was guaranteed (under conditions) both in 
the statutes and in the oaths that judges of Crete swore. In fact an event from the late fifteenth 
century illustrates explicitly the way in which judges contributed to the proliferation of prison 
sentences: in 1471 the Venetian Ssenate stated that the rectors of Chanea, Rethymnon, and 
Seteia, were in the habit of imposing short prison sentences in purely civil cases, thus making 
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the cases appear criminal and making it harder for the defendants to appeal.88 It is worth 
noting that even when this was revealed, the Ssenate did not try to put an end to this practice, 
but merely stipulated that the defendants should be given the right to appeal even if they had 
been sentenced to imprisonment.       
Having examined the crimes for which one might be imprisoned, it is worth 
considering what kind of people ended up in prison. Our evidence here is very fragmentary 
and not much can be stated with confidence, but certain broad conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, it is evident that people from all walks of life, all classes, all religious groups and both 
sexes were represented in Candia’s prisons. It is true that the upper classes had more 
opportunities to avoid prison, thanks to their ability to pay fines, but nevertheless we know of 
numerous nobles who were held in prison, not least for their part in various rebellions. On the 
other side of the social spectrum, we also know of members of the unfree classes being 
imprisoned. It is known, of course, that slaves and serfs accused of crimes were detained 
while awaiting trial, but there is evidence to suggest that masters had the right to imprison 
their slaves and serfs in state prisons without trial.89 Thus, for example, two female slaves, 
named Maria and Rada, were said to be imprisoned in 1345 at the request of their masters.90 
Similarly, the serf Michael Quiriacopulo, who escaped from prison in 1348, had also been 
detained at his master’s request.91  
It is also evident that in Candia members of all three major ethnic and religious 
groups (Greeks, Latins, and Jews) shared prison space in the prisons of Candia. Given the 
preponderance of Greeks on the island, it is likely that the Greeks would have also 
outnumbered the other two groups in the prisons as well, but there is no shortage of either of 
the three in the sources. No segregation of ethnicities and creeds seems to have taken place, 
as on several occasions prisoners from all these differentthree backgrounds were said to have 
escaped from prison together.92 It is worth pointing out that amongst the Greek prisoners it is 
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not uncommon to encounter priests and monks. This is because the Greek clergy of Crete 
(with the exception of 130 priests) came under the jurisdiction of the Venetian lay authorities, 
rather than that of the Latin archbishop. This state of affairs was blatantly uncanonical, but it 
was symptomatic of Venice’s efforts to minimizse external influence (including the Latin 
Church’s influence) over her territories.93 Furthermore, because the Latin archbishop of the 
island was normally a Venetian citizen and a faithful subject of the Republic, these 
challenges to his authority went uncontested. As a result, the Greek clergy of Crete –, which 
should normally have been exempt of lay jurisdiction –, was tried by secular courts and 
punished just likewith the same measures as the laity. On the contrary, I have located no 
reference to Latin priests being imprisoned in the public prisons of Crete. That said, it is 
worth pointing out that even in Venice the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Grado and the 
bishop of Castello over their clergy was being gradually curbed, with the result that by the 
end of the fourteenth century, priests found guilty of serious offences were being imprisoned 
in the state’s, rather than the episcopal, prison.94      
Finally, the Latin prison population of Candia also included non- Venetians, like such 
as the Genoese prisoner of war Andriolus de Travaria de Rapallo, who in 1350 escaped from 
the Hospitale Novum where he had been transferred in order to recover from illness.95 
It may be worth noting that many of the prisoners of medieval Candia would not have 
thought of themselves as criminals, nor would they be thought of as such by their 
contemporaries. The ease with which one might end up in prison, especially for debt, meant 
the stigma attached to such sentences was relatively insignificant. The case is amply 
illustrated by the example of Leonardus Dellaporta, who as we have seen achieved an 
admirable career in public office despite his incarceration in 1364, and to whom we shall 
return shortly. It is also demonstrated by the multitude of wills bequeathing money to 
prisoners, certain of which stipulate that the money should only benefit those who had been 
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imprisoned for debt. This shows awareness of the fact that the legal system was fairly 
indiscriminate in its application of penalties, and recognition that not all inmates were equally 
deserving of charity. All this is in perfect accordance with recent research concerning debt 
imprisonment in Italy, where it has been stated that financial activity carried with it the risk 
of prison and this was recognizsed and accepted as a fact of life.96 Despite this, however, it 
has to be said that, as far as Crete is concerned, the prospect of imprisonment remained a 
terrifying one for debtors.  How else can one explain the fact that frequently debtors would 
abandon the island (presumably along with any hope for a decent and normal life) in order to 
avoid prison?  
  
Organizsation of the prisons and living conditions 
As we have seen, the prisons of Venice fell under the jurisdiction of various of the 
Republic’s magistracies and offices, including, for example, the Council of Ten and the 
Council of Forty. The governmental system of Crete mimicked the structure of Venetian 
government, but in reality power was located in the hands of the duke and his two 
councillors, who were answerable directly to Venice. Below these positions there existed a 
multitude of public offices and magistracies, modelled on Venice’s own, which were filled by 
the residents of Crete, either by election or by appointment. Certain offices were reserved for 
the noble feudatories of the island, while others were available to the cittadini and still others 
were available to the wider public.97 
Notices about the administration of the prisons, mainly appearing in the directives 
emanating from Venice, are extremely rare in our sources, but they illustrate some surprising 
departures from Venetian custom. Contrary to what was the case in Venetian prisons, where 
prisoners were not burdened with the cost of their own incarceration, it appears that prisoners 
in Crete had to shoulder at least part of this cost: in 1340 an embassy from the feudatories of 
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Chanea unsuccessfully petitioned the Venetian Senate to reduce the amount payable by each 
inmate to a single grosso.98 The document does not state how much prisoners were currently 
paying, nor does it offer any explanation as to the nature of this fee. It seems likely, however, 
that this was a one- off payment that inmates had to make upon imprisonment in order to 
offset the cost of their incarceration, as was the case in many Italian prisons.99 
Another innovation was instituted in June 1363, exactly a month before the outbreak 
of the rebellion Revolt of Saint Titus. At that time, the Venetian Senate ordered the 
government of Crete to lease the four prisons of Crete to private individuals, following a 
bidding process.100 The proceeds from the lease would go into the public coffers. Presumably, 
the successful bidder would hope to make a profit from the fees paid by prisoners upon arrest, 
and from whatever other sums he could extract from them.101 This attempted reform of prison 
administration was an unqualified disaster. In 1371 the Cretan government wrote to Venice 
informing the Senate that the private wardens were entirely unsuitable, and that because of 
their maladministration the prisons were in shambles, and murderers and debtors were 
breaking out on a daily basis. Moreover, that year’s auctioning of the prisons had only earned 
the state the measly sum of 160 hyperpera.102 The Senate, therefore, allowed the Cretan 
government to appoint public officials to oversee the private wardens.    
 A few years later, the plan was scrapped altogether, the prisons reverted to public 
administration, and two posts known as capitanei carcerum, i.e.  (public prison wardens) 
were created. A directive dating from 1392 instructs the government of Crete to advertise 
these two positions, one for the carcer castelli and one for the carcer ponentis. All candidates 
would have to register their interest with the chancery within eight days, at the end of which 
the committee which regulated the appointment of castellans and other officials would 
proceed to an election.103 It is evident that these posts were among the lower public offices 
that were open to the general population of Candia.  
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The attempted – and ultimately unsuccessful –- privatizsation of the prison system is 
of particular interest, for it represents a rare departure from customary Venetian practice, 
whereby the prisons were ruan directly by the state, and prisoners were not required to pay 
for their upkeep. The reasons that led to this experiment are not at all hard to divine: already 
from 1326 there had been grumblings from on the part of the Venetians of Crete, concerning 
the heavy taxation they were subjected to;104 exactly a month after the attempted prison 
reform, the Saint Titus rebellion broke out, following the imposition of a new levy on the 
local feudatories. The privatizsation of the prison system must, therefore, be seen as an 
attempt to cut public spending and, perhaps, alleviate financial pressure on the tax-payers of 
Candia. The reform was likely even more short-lived than the official documentation 
suggests. The upheaval of Saint Titus probably delayed the enactment of the new measures 
until the final years of the 1360s. By 1371 public officials were again overseeing the 
administration of the prisons, and by 1392 the prisons were once more operated directly by 
the state.   
A second office relating to the prisons was the one referred to as custos, the prison 
guard. The appointment of prison guards must have followed a procedure similar to that of 
the wardens, but I have only located only one such appointment and that dating before the 
attempted reform: in 1314, a certain Iohannes de Larosa was appointed to the post, as a 
reward for his faithfulness to the Republic, and in recognition of a miracle operated by Saint 
Nicholas in favour of Iohannes’s son!105 This appointment must have been an atypical one, as 
it was decided in Venice. Normally, low- ranking public officials were appointed by the local 
councils.  In later centuries it appears that only two such guards existed, one for each of the 
main prisons.106 Though the number seems very low, it should not surprise us, given the fact 
that in the fourteenth century the prisons of Italy only employed between three and eight 
guards in the fourteenth century, even though prison populations sometimes rose to several 
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hundred inmates.107 No other prison functionaries apart from the wardens and guards are 
mentioned in our sources. The small number of custodial staff may explain the frequency of 
prison break outs.  
Escapes from prison were very common indeed, and reveal the inefficacy of the 
prison system. Even though incomplete, our sources attest to no fewer than seventeen 
breakouts in the years 1317 to 1352.108 The situation deteriorated further after the 
unsuccessful privatizsation of the prison system in 1363. As we have seen, in 1371 the 
government asserted that prison escapes had become daily occurrences. Some of the 
breakouts were particularly eventful: in June 1328, for example, a perjurer convicted to six 
months in prison escaped after attacking and incapacitating the guard.109 In July 1341 there 
was a prison break in which the sons of the rebels Vardas Kallergis, Costas Smerilio, and 
Siphopoulos all managed to escape.110 In October 1346 another rebel’s son, Iohannes 
Melissinos, escaped along with seven other inmates.111 In 1350, in the most clichéd of 
escapes, a Genoese prisoner of war absconded from the hospital to which he had been 
transferred as he was convalescing from illness.112 In August 1345, less than two months after 
a previous prison break, fourteen inmates made good their escape from the carcer castelli.113 
In June 1338, four men disappeared from prison along with their prison guard.114 Evidently 
assuming that the guard had been bribed, the authorities included him in the list of fugitives. 
The most peculiar of prison escapes occurred in October 1348. It was alleged that a woman 
who was living with the guard of the carcer castelli took his prison keys in the night and 
opened the gates letting everybody out.115 Wanting to find out Wishing to determine exactly 
what had happened, the government offered amnesty and a reward of ten hyperpera to 
Theodorus Malaspina (who had been imprisoned for debt), Michael Quiriacopulo (a serf 
imprisoned at the request of his master), and Dominicus (a soldier of the Castro Bonifacii) if 
they returned within five days to give testimony. This must have prompted the establishment 
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of to impose new procedures for the safekeeping of the prison keys, for by 1392 the keys 
were no longer kept at the guards’ houses overnight. Rather, the keys of the Castellum were 
taken to the residences of the councillors and those of the carcer ponentis were delivered to 
the ducal palace. At that time, however, the Venetian Ssenate wrote to the Cretan government 
that all keys should be taken to the residence of the duke at night. The duke would then 
appoint a suitable person to take the keys and do the nightly rounds, before returning them in 
the morning.116  
Even more problematic than the breakouts, were the escapes of prisoners during 
transportation to Candia. As has been mentioned, when local authorities captured wanted men 
in their jurisdiction, they were obliged to dispatch them to Candia to stand trial. Often, 
however, the detachments fell victim to raids by the prisoners’ kinsfolk. Between 1321 and 
1332, at least ten such raids, resulting in prisoner escapes, are attested.117 It is worth noting 
that in all but two of these cases the prisoners and the raiders were Greek, and often identified 
as serfs. The accounts of these raids paint a vivid picture of the lawlessness of the island’s 
countryside, which stood in stark contrast to the well-regulated urban environment. They also 
complement our picture of Greek civil disobedience against the Venetian authorities, which is 
already well-evidenced by the enthusiastic participation of the rural population in the 
rebellions of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Clearly, the disenfranchised lower strata 
of Greek society put little stock by the Republic’s judicial system, and thought little ofnot 
averse to resorting to violence against the authorities. 
While tThe living conditions within the prisons were certainly unpleasant for all, they 
but must have varied widely. Unfortunately, several factors hinder our understanding of daily 
life within the prisons of Candia. Most importantly, the fact that the physical structures 
themselves have not survived makes it difficult to form any idea of the scale of the prisons 
and the size of the population they might have accommodated. Similarly, no account books or 
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other registers concerning the prisons have been preserved, though such books were certainly 
kept at the time.118 Despite these obvious shortcomings of our sources, we ought to assume 
that the prisons of Candia were considerably smaller than those of Venice and the other 
Italian cities. The different scale of the cities themselves is enough to convince us of this: 
whereas before the Black Death Venice had an urban population of between 80,000 and 
120,000 (and about 160,000 if we take into account the entire lagoon area), Candia’s 
population may not have been larger than 10,000 (though the population of the entire island 
of Crete was probably around 150,000).119 Although as we have seen criminals from the 
entire island were liable to be imprisoned in Candia, in practice the great majority of the 
prisons’ population would have been culled frombelong to the city itself rather than to the 
rest of the island. A number of considerations point to this conclusion: firstly, only a minority 
of cases from the countryside were tried in Candia, for the local officials were allowed to try 
the minor cases in their own domains; added to this was the fact that, as mentioned above, 
escaping justice was altogether easier in the rural areas, where the accused could count on the 
support of kinsfolk and the inaccessibility of the terrain. Finally and most importantly, a great 
proportion of those imprisoned had been incarcerated for ‘urban’ offences’, such as 
corruption or debt. With all this in mind, we may guess that the prison population of Candia 
could perhaps be counted in the dozens, rather than in the hundreds, as was the case in the 
Italian city-states. 
Those under investigation or awaiting trial suffered greatly because torture was 
regularly and legitimately applied (usually in the form of the strappado) in order to obtain 
confessions.120 Women were, in theory at least, more humanely treated by Venetian law, as is 
evidenced by a number of statutes that stipulate slightly more compassionate sentences for 
female offenders.121 In practice, however, their questioning was occasionally horrific.122 In 
1314 an order from Venice stated that the female prisoners of Crete were detained in the 
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castellum which was disreputable and unsuitable for women, and charged the duke with 
finding a new prison for them.123 It is evident, therefore, that until 1314 female prisoners 
were detained in the same prison as the men. Their living conditions there must have been 
comparable to those of the men, with the added discomfort and dangers of being confined in 
close proximity to the male population. No information has survived concerning the new 
location of the women’s prison, but it is assumed that this was the third of the four prisons 
attested in Crete by the mid-fourteenth century.  
Conditions were also harsh for those prisoners who had been sentenced to 
incarceration in the ‘lower’ prison. The lower prison was a concept that existed in Italy and 
other parts of Europe as well, and which also had a classical antecedent.124 The term 
obviously refers to a dungeon, though by this time the cells were not necessarily 
underground. In Venice, the more serious offenders were held in cells called le camerete, la 
Chatolda, and la Grandoina, situated on the ground floor of the Dducal Ppalace.125 These 
cells were shared by numerous prisoners unless solitary confinement had been stipulated.126 It 
is reasonable to assume that the same applied in Candia. Sentences to the lower prison are 
rare in the sources and are reserved for the worst of the offenders. This is surely an indication 
of how inhospitable this area of the prison was. Occasionally there are also sentences that 
stipulate that the prisoner ought to be chained while serving his sentence.127 It is possible that 
these, too, were convictions to the lower prison. Only on a single occasion do we hear of a 
prisoner who succeeded in escaping from the lower prison.128  
For the rest of the inmates conditions were more humane. If the case of Venice is 
anything to go by, prisoners spent the nights in their cells but were allowed to walk around 
the corridors during the day. We are fortunate enough to possess an account of prison life in 
the form of a poem, written by the father of Cretan literature, Stephanos Sachlikes, whilst he 
was imprisoned around 1370. Sachlikes belonged to A member of the noble classes,.129 He 
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Sachlikes was of Greek extraction but though his family may have converted to Catholicism, 
and had owned fiefs and seats on the governmental councils. Sachlikes himself had served on 
the Major Consilium between 1356 and 1360. However he favoured a dissolute lifestyle and 
spent most of his fortune gambling and womanizsing. Though the reason for his 
imprisonment is unknown, he blames it on a woman.  
Among the scurrilous and humorous poems he wrote in prison, he composed a lament 
of his present condition, which has preserved much incidental information about the 
hardships of prison.130 The physical space is described as a dark and filthy place which 
punishes the body just like purgatory punishes the soul. He complains about the stench, the 
absence of windows and the fleas and lice which he says are bigger than ants. His worst 
complaints, however, are reserved for the jailors, whose only concern, he claims, is the 
exaction of bribes from wealthy inmates, and whom he describes as crueller than the 
cynocephali. Upon first arriving at the prison, the inmates are treated harshly and are locked 
away for long periods; but this is only a ploy on the part of the jailors in order to scare the 
prisoners into offering bribes. The jailors follow the same tactics with regards to the inmate’s 
family. When the family comes to visit, the jailors refuse to give them access, and pretend 
that the courts have ordered that the prisoner be detained in solitary confinement. Of course 
they soon allow visitations, once they have received their bribes. Every so often they would 
revert to their hostile behaviour, in order to remind the prisoner to continue the payments. It 
is clear from Sachlikes’s account that he had his own private cell, in which he was locked at 
night. In the morning, the guard would arrive and unlock the door. Meals were served twice a 
day, seemingly inside the cell. Sachlikes’s most bitter complaint is that his jailor joined him 
for all of his meals and, furthermore, ate most of his food. Not only that, but he also invited 
his friends (Germans and Lombards), who shared the meals, got drunk, and sang songs in 
their own language. This account of ‘banquets’ inside a private cell, with decent food as well 
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as wine, shows that, as a well-to-do inmate, Sachlikes was paying for extra privileges, thus 
also attracting the unwelcome attention of the prison guard and his friends.131 This would also 
explain the line ‘ὅσα μὲ φυλακίσασιν, ὅσα δηνάρια χάνω’, which suggests that prison was a 
continual drain on his resources.132 Despite Sachlikes’s many complaints about the physical 
discomforts of prison, it is clear that one of the most painful aspects of his incarceration was 
his loss of social status. In particular, he disdains the fact that his social inferiors (i.e., the 
guard and his companions) had authority over him and treated him condescendingly.  
Even allowing for poetic licencse, Sachlikes offers valuable information about the 
everyday life of the convicts: we learn that prisoners (or at least some of them) were locked 
in private cells at night; that they received two meals pera day; that they were allowed visitors 
(provided the jailors did not block them); and that various outsiders were admitted into the 
prisons and even into the cells. We also get glimpses of the privileges that upper- class 
prisoners could enjoy (among which we must assume were the facilities and implements for 
writing) and of the cost – both material and psychological- – at by which those privileges 
were purchased.133 Despite Sachlikes’ protestations about the conditions of his detention, it is 
hard to escape the impression that he was among the most privileged of his coeval prisoners. 
Nevertheless, the incidental detail in his description of the jailor’s avarice rings true; 
particularly so, considering that his imprisonment would have coincided with the period of 
the prisons’ semi-privatizsation.  
Sachlikes’s younger contemporary, Leonardus Dellaporta, also a notable poet, was 
imprisoned not once, but twice. As we have seen, his first stint in prison was the result of 
some incautious words during the rebellion Revolt of Saint Titus. Both his career and his 
reputation recovered from this setback, and he was later appointed advocatus per omnes 
curias in Candia as well as an ambassador in important diplomatic missions. In his old age he 
was imprisoned for a second time, and spent his sentence writing the poems for which he is 
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famous.134 Unlike Sachlikes, he gives no information about life in prison, but what he says of 
his conviction exemplifies some of the points made above about prison sentences and their 
liberal application in conjunction with other penalties. His offence is not known, but it was 
the result of an amorous relationship with a woman. He states that he was falsely accused by 
her, and was dragged to court and unjustly condemned. He was sentenced to deprivation of 
public office, a fine to the state, child support for a child he did not believe to be his, and 
three months in prison.135 Despite his bemoaning of the fact that the conviction humiliated 
and stigmatizsed him, after his release he achieved another position of relative prominence, 
as the lay prior of the hospital of Saint Lazarus.136    
 
Conclusion 
     The evidence concerning incarceration and prison sentences in fourteenth-century 
Candia, shows a legal system in a state of transition. Incarceration is still employed widely in 
its traditional form, as a coercive penalty for defaulting debtors. At the same time, however, it 
is used extensively as a supplementary punishment for a variety of other offencses for which 
the Venetian statutes do not prescribe imprisonment. This shift is amply illustrated by the 
ordinances of the Venetian government of Crete, which very often prescribed incarceration as 
the punishment for very specific offences. These ordinances are essentially ad hoc revisions 
of the Venetian laws, which would not always have been in tune with the realities of life in 
the colony. One tendency that is readily observable is the use of incarceration in particular for 
non- violent offences against the state or the public interest. Thus, imprisonment is used 
extensively in cases of corruption, perjury, forgery, infringement of trading laws, and all 
manner of other offences that threatened the colony’s status quo and prosperity, like such as 
the harbouring of escaped slaves, or the introduction of Greek monks into the island.    
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In western jurisprudence generally, the expansion of the prison-sentence’s remit 
coincides with the mitigation and eventually the extinction of some of the harsher penalties. It 
therefore marks a move towards the more humane treatment of convicts. This process is 
particularly evident in Italy, and especially Venice and Florence, where it was facilitated by 
the wide-ranging powers afforded to the judges.137 The situation in Crete accords perfectly 
with the increased use of penal incarceration, often in conjunction with fines, in fourteenth-
century Italy. The fact, however, that the system was still in transition resulted in some 
paradoxical and arguably unfair arrangements. Most obviously, it often predicated a longer 
sentence for defaulting debtors than actual wrongdoers. This, as we have seen, created serious 
disturbances in the life of the colony, forcing both the local and the metropolitan authorities 
to legislate in favour of insolvent debtors.  
 Moreover, the simultaneous use of fines and prison sentences was disproportionately 
burdensome to the lower classes. As we have seen, such sentences stipulated that the prison 
term would not officially begin until the offender had first paid the concomitant fine. This 
meant that those who could not afford the fine served much longer prison sentences than the 
wealthier convicts. Of course, the preferential treatment of the upper classes was by no means 
a novelty, and indeed it was in fact sanctioned by law. We have seen for example that certain 
offences incurred sentences that were graded according to the offender’s social class and 
legal status. Though in theory all these punishments reflected the severity of the crime, in 
practice they were far lighter for the nobility than they were for the lower classes.138 In 
addition to these ‘legitimate’ discrepancies in sentencing, various abuses also favoured the 
upper classes at the expense of the lower ones. The clearest example of this is the practice of 
allowing wealthy convicts to buy their freedom by hiring mercenaries to serve in the fleet for 
the duration of their sentence. Even by the standards of the day this was seen as unjust, and 
the practice was terminated by order of the Venetian Ssenate.     
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All ethnic groups were represented in the prisons of Candia, so it is clear that ethnicity 
in itself was not a factor in the imposition of prison sentences. However, the unequal 
treatment of the different social classes would have meant that the Greek population, much of 
which was servile or semi-free, was more vulnerable not just to incarceration, but to harsher 
penalties in general. There is evidence, for example, to suggest that slaves and serfs could be 
imprisoned in state prisons merely at the request of their owners, without a trial. Whether this 
resulted in a higher percentage of Greeks among the prison population cannot be ascertained. 
Even if that was were indeed the case, it would have been only natural, given that the Greeks 
vastly outnumbered the Latins on the island. The one instance in which the Greeks are much 
more conspicuous than the Latins with regards to imprisonment, is in the raids carried out 
against government officials transporting prisoners to Candia. It is worth noting that most of 
the prisoners in question were both lower class (usually serfs) and accused of serious crimes 
(i.e., murder or robbery). Moreover, they would have been tried in an area far from their own 
homes, where they would essentially be strangers. Consequently, they would have been 
facing penalties much harsher than imprisonment, and would have had very little hope of 
acquittal. Under these such conditions it is not difficult to see why their families would have 
opted for such extreme measures. These events must be seen as acts of civil disobedience by 
the most disenfranchised segment of the population, and moreover the one segment treated 
most harshly by the legal system.  
This legal system emerges as entirely consistent with Wwestern developments in 
jurisprudence. Though it cannot be denied that Byzantine traditions survived on the island of 
Crete, especially with regards to laws on land and agriculture, as far as the penal code was 
concerned, the one major influence was the judicial practice of Venice.139 Of course, 
similarities with Byzantium’s penal codes are not at all hard to find (notably in the 
incarceration of debtors), but these have to be ascribed to the common origins of Byzantine 
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and Venetian law, rather than to any survival of  Byzantine juridical practice on the island of 
Crete. In fact, the evidence concerning incarceration in Crete demonstrates not only the 
primacy of the Venetian statutes in the legal affairs of Crete, but also the continuity of current 
practice from the courts of Venice to those of Crete. For although the statutes reflect the 
Venetian legal theory of the early thirteenth century, with its still  limited use of penal 
incarceration, the evidence from fourteenth-century Crete reflects perfectly the legal practice 
of Venice in the fourteenth century. Going backTo return to the issue of the sources of law 
for the colony, and the thorny matter of ‘custom’ and ‘precedent’, we may be certain that, as 
far as penal affairs were concerned, the only custom and precedent that mattered was that of 
Venice and not that of the Byzantine past. Moreover, the biennial appointment of high 
officials from Venice ensured that the latest Venetian precedents were taken into account in 
the court cases of Crete, with little or no lag between the juridical developments of the colony 
and those of the metropolis.  
It was remarked at the beginning of this essay that a different set of circumstances 
obtained in medieval Greece than those that had led to the evolution of the prison system in 
wWestern Europe, with regards to legal tradition and political and religious authority. Given 
this fact, one may perhaps be surprised to find such close correspondence between the 
juridical developments of Venice and her colony, despite the local peculiarities of Crete. Yet, 
ironically, it may have been just these peculiarities that led to the strict adherence to the 
Venetian model: the insecurity of the Venetian regime in Crete, the high proportion of Greeks 
among the population, the lawlessness of the countryside and the frequent rebellions (on one 
occasion even by the Venetian colonists) all led to an almost paranoid preoccupation with the 
maintenance of the rule of law and the upholding of the status quo. Under these conditions 
the Venetians were ill-inclined to experiment with matters pertaining to law and order, 
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though they were much more flexible in other areas (notably the administration of land, 
where they adopted and adapted both Wwestern, non-Venetian, and Greek models).1     
All of this resulted in an unusual occurrence: the Latin states of medieval Greece, 
affected by instability, warfare and competing influences, tended to preserve fossilizsed 
institutions or, at best, to give rise to sui generis hybrid ones. Here, by contrast, we have a 
rare example of a Latin state of Greece joining its colonial metropolis at the forefront of the 
advances made in Wwestern jurisprudence and penal law.                
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